We study arbitrage opportunities, market viability and utility maximization in market models with an insider. Assuming that an economic agent possesses an additional information in the form of an F T -measurable random variable G, we give criteria for the No Unbounded Profits with Bounded Risk property to hold, characterize optimal arbitrage strategies, and prove duality results for the utility maximization problem faced by the insider. Examples of markets satisfying NUPBR yet admitting arbitrage opportunities are provided for both atomic and continuous random variables G.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study arbitrage opportunities and utility maximization in market modes with an insider. Insider information is typically modeled by using the mathematical theory of enlargement of filtration, where one distinguishes initial, successive and progressive enlargement. In this paper we restrict ourselves to the setting of initial enlargement by a random variable G: at time zero the insider knows the realization of G, which the ordinary agents only observe at the end of the trading period that we shall assume to be finite. Note that some concepts of arbitrage under initial enlargement and progressive enlargement on an infinite horizon have recently been studied in [1] and [2] .
Insider trading under initial enlargement of filtration has been the object of interest of many papers, including but by no means limited to [12, 3, 16, 6, 7, 4, 32, 17] . The majority of these papers work in a complete market setting and are concerned with the question of additional utility of the insider; they find that when the variable G is F T -measurable and not purely atomic, this additional utility is often infinite.
In contrast to these papers, our main interest lies in exploring various concepts of arbitrage in the context of initial filtration enlargement. In particular, we are interested in the following questions.
• When does the market for the insider satisfy the property NUPBR (no unbounded profit with bounded risk)? The NUPBR condition, see [24] , or, equivalently, No Arbitrage of the first kind (NA1) (see also NAA1 in [23] , and BK in [22] ), boils down to assuming that no positive claim, which is not identically zero, may be superhedged at zero price. It is the minimal condition enabling one to solve portfolio optimization problems in a meaningful way: in [24] it is shown that, without NUPBR, one has either no solution or infinitely many. NUPBR is robust with respect to changes of numeraire, absolutely continuous measure change and, in some cases, change of reference filtration (see e.g. [15] ). Finally, it is also known [24] that NFLVR (the classical assumption of no free lunch with vanishing risk) is equivalent to NUPBR plus the classical no arbitrage assumption (NA), which means that markets with NUPBR can still admit (unscalable) arbitrage opportunities.
• When does the market for the insider admit optimal arbitrage? We say that a financial market admits optimal arbitrage if there exists a strategy which allows to superhedge a unit amount with an initial cost which is strictly less than one in some states of nature (note that the initial cost of a strategy for the insider may be a random variable since the insider possesses a nontrivial information already at time t = 0). We say that the optimal arbitrage is strong whenever the replication cost is strictly less than one with probability one. In other words, an optimal arbitrage strategy allows to replicate a risk-free zero coupon bond at a price which is strictly less than the initial price of this bond (see [8] for possible uses of such strategies in the context of asset liability management for e.g., pension funds).
To address the above questions, we distinguish the cases when the additional information is represented by a discrete (atomic) random variable G and when it is given by a random variable G which is not purely atomic. The discrete case is the easier one, and allows us to provide full answers to the above questions. Namely, the following results are shown to be true under natural assumptions in the case when G is discrete.
• The market for the insider satisfies the NUPBR property.
• If the original market (for non-informed agents) is complete, then the market for the insider admits strong optimal arbitrage. If the original market is incomplete, the optimal arbitrage may or may not exist, and we give examples of both situations.
The case when G is not purely atomic is more difficult, and only partial answers to the above questions are provided in this paper for this case. Our first contribution here is to establish a new necessary condition for the insider market to satisfy the NUPBR property. This condition is, in particular, violated by all complete markets, which means that complete markets always admit an arbitrage of the first kind. In the incomplete markets the situation is less clear, and we provide examples of both an incomplete market violating NUPBR and of an incomplete market for which NUPBR holds and logarithmic utility of the insider is finite, although the market admits arbitrage opportunities.
In addition to the above results, we also address the problem of utility optimization for the insider. In this context, our contribution is two-fold. First, we show that the utility maximization problem for the insider may be expressed in terms of the quantities (strategies, martingale measures) defined in the original market for the uninformed agents. This in turn allows us to develop an extension of the classical duality results for utility maximization to market models with an insider. These results are first obtained in the case of a discrete initial information G, and then extended to a non purely atomic G with a limiting procedure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the market model and recall the basic notions of no-arbitrage and filtration enlargement.
In section 3 we deal with initial enlargement by a discrete random variable G. We show that, under a suitable assumption, a market initially enlarged with a discrete r.v. G always satisfies NUPBR. In subsection 3.1 we then study optimal arbitrage that can be implemented via superhedging. We show that the superhedging price of a given claim for the insider may be represented in terms of the superhedging prices in the filtration of ordinary agents of the claim restricted to the events corresponding to the various possible values of G. In subsection 3.2 we consider portfolio optimization, in particular the maximization of expected utility and obtain a duality relationship. An example computation of optimal arbitrage and maximal expected log-utility for the insider in an incomplete market is presented in subsection 3.3.
In section 4 we study the initial enlargement with a random variable G, which is not purely atomic. We first show that if the set of possible martingale densities is uniformly integrable, then NUPBR cannot hold. We then present an approximation procedure allowing to obtain results for a general random variable G by a limiting procedure from the results obtained for a discrete variable G in section 3. This procedure allows us to extend the results on utility optimization to the case of general G in subsection 4.3. Finally, the Appendix contains some technical proofs.
Market model and preliminaries related to filtration enlargement
In this section we introduce our basic market model and recall known concepts as we shall use them in the sequel (subsection 2.1). We then introduce some preliminaries in relation to filtration enlargement (subsection 2.2).
Market model and basic notions
On a stochastic basis (Ω, F , F, P), where the filtration F = (F t ) t≥0 , t ≤ T satisfies the usual conditions, consider a financial market with an R d −valued nonnegative semimartingale process S = (S 1 , . . . , S d ), t ≤ T , where the components represent the prices of d risky assets. The horizon is supposed to be finite and given by T > 0. We assume that the price processes are already discounted, namely for the riskless asset price S 0 we assume S 0 ≡ 1, and that this market is frictionless. Let L(S) be the set of all R d −valued S−integrable predictable processes and, for H ∈ L(S) denote by H · S the vector stochastic integral of H with respect to S. 
and K denotes the set of claims that can be replicated with zero initial cost and any admissible strategy:
In the sequel, we shall use the following no-arbitrage conditions.
Definition 2.2 (NFLVR). We say that there is No Free Lunch with Vanishing Risk if
where the closure is taken with respect to the topology of uniform convergence.
Definition 2.3 (NUPBR). There is No Unbounded Profit With Bounded Risk if the set
The NUPBR condition can be shown to be equivalent to the following, more economically meaningful condition, which boils down to assuming that no positive claim, which is not identically zero, may be superhedged at zero price with a positive portfolio (see [21] for a recent discussion of the different equivalent formulations of NUPBR). 
Definition 2.4 (NA1
In our context (nonnegative processes), NFLVR is equivalent to the existence of at least one equivalent local martingale measure [13] . The set of all such measures will be denoted by ELMM(F, P) and the set of corresponding densities will be denoted by ELMMD(F, P). NUPBR is, in turn, equivalent to the existence of a local martingale deflator [25, 37, 36] . In addition, NFLVR is equivalent to NUPBR plus NA [24] .
Preliminaries in relation to filtration enlargement
We start again from a filtered probability space (Ω, F , F, P), on which we consider a financial market with an insider. Starting from F = (F t ) one can then consider the (initially) enlarged filtration G = (G t ) with
In the context of filtration enlargements it is important to have a criterion which ensures that an F−local martingale remains a G−semimartingale. In view of introducing the corresponding condition, let ν t := P{G ∈ dx | F t } be the regular conditional distribution of G, given F t , and ν := P{G ∈ dx} be the law of G. We shall require Jacod's condition (see [18] ) in the following form Assumption 2.7. (Absolutely continuous version of Jacod's condition). We assume that ν t ≪ ν, P − a.s. for t < T.
Notice that the absolute continuity is imposed only before the terminal time T . In our setting, where G ∈ F T , the absolute continuity cannot hold at the terminal date. Some papers on insider trading require that ν t ∼ ν (see, e.g., [4] ) but this would imply that the density of ν t with respect to ν is strictly positive and so allow one to construct an equivalent martingale measure from the density process before the terminal time T [4] . This would imply NFLVR for the (G, P)− market (before time T ) and thus exclude arbitrage possibilities there, which is not our purpose.
We need one more assumption, which refers to the density process of ν t with respect to ν. To this effect we first recall from Lemme 1.8 and Corollaire 1.11 of [18] that we can choose a nice version of the density, namely we have the following lemma where O(F) denotes the F-optional sigma field on Ω × R + .
Lemma 2.8. Under Assumption 2.7, there exists a nonnegative
B ⊗ O(F)-measurable function R × Ω × R + ∋ (x, ω,t) → p x t (ω) ∈ [0, ∞), càdlàg in t such that 1. for every t ∈ [0, T ), we have ν t (dx) = p x t (ω)ν(dx).
for each x
The conditional density process p G is also the key to find the semimartingale decomposition of an F−local martingale in the enlarged filtration G.
We come now to the announced additional assumption Assumption 2.9. For every x, the process p x does not jump to zero, i.e.
This assumption is used in [26] for a general construction of strict local martingales, in [35] for a construction of markets with arbitrages and in [10] for the study of optimal arbitrage when agents have non equivalent beliefs. This assumption is also used to prove the preservation of NUPBR in the enlarged market over an infinite horizon, see [1] or Theorem 6(a) of [2] .
Enlargement with a discrete random variable
In this section we consider the case when the random variable G of the (initial) enlargement is a discrete random variable G ∈ {g 1 , . . . , g n }, with n ≥ 2 and P[G = g i ] > 0 for all i. After a general theorem concerning NUPBR for this case, we study optimal arbitrage in subsection 3.1 and provide a dual representation for expected utility maximization in subsection 3.2. An example for computing optimal arbitrage and maximal expected utility for the insider is presented in subsection 3.3 for the case of an incomplete market.
Notice first that the initial enlargement with a discrete random variable is a classical case studied already by P. A. Meyer [30] and by many other authors. For this case it is known that every F−local martingale is a G−semimartingale on [0, T ] and it is not necessary to impose Jacod's condition. We shall however make the Assumption 2.9.
In the discrete case the insider can update her belief with a measure change P → Q i thereby dismissing all scenarios not contained in {G = g i }. The measure Q i satisfies
It gives total mass to {G = g i } and is absolutely continuous but not equivalent to P. The following theorem shows that NUPBR always holds true in this setting. Proof. The statement is proved by way of contradiction, noticing that NUPBR is equivalent to NA1. Assume that there is an arbitrage of the first kind in the (G, P)-market, i.e., we can find an F T -measurable random variable ξ (because
Choose an index i such that
Let us look at the hedging strategy H G,ε 1 G=g i under Q i . Recall that (see [20] ) the predictable process H G,ε is of the form H
is F−predictable and we have the representation H G,ε 1 {G=g i } =H F,ε,i 1 {G=g i } whereH F,i,ε is a F-predictable strategy. Thus (3) implies that ξ is an arbitrage of the first kind in the (F, Q i )-market, which is equivalent to the failure of NUPBR in the Q i -market. Notice next that, for each i ∈ {1, ..., n}, the (F, Q i )-market is obtained from the (F, P)-market by an absolutely continuous measure change, see (1) . Furthermore, the density process p g i does not jump to zero, by Assumption 2.9. By Theorem 4.1 of [10] this implies that the condition NUPBR holds for the (F, Q i )-market thus proving the contradiction and with it the statement.
Recently Acciaio et al. [1] gave sufficient conditions for NUPBR to hold in the (G, P)−market by constructing a martingale deflator under G (see also the introductory part to section 4 below). The construction of local martingale deflators is also given in Proposition 10 (for quasi left-continuous F-local martingales), Proposition 11, and Theorem 6 of [2] . However they work on an infinite horizon requiring the absolute continuity in Jacod's hypothesis to hold at all times and so their approach cannot be adapted to our finite horizon case.
Theorem 3.1 shows that, under the Assumption 2.9, the (G, P)−market satisfies NUPBR; it does not exclude that it satisfies also NFLVR. This depends on the possibility of classical arbitrage in the various specific cases. The study of such arbitrage opportunities is the subject of the next section.
Optimal arbitrage via superhedging
The notion of optimal arbitrage goes back to [14] . Here, following [10] , we relate optimal arbitrage to superhedging. We start from a definition of the superhedging price which is adapted to the context of filtration enlargement. Whenever in the sequel the filtration may be either F of G, we shall use the symbol H ∈ {F, G}. 
Definition 3.2. Let H ∈ {F, G} and let f
and, if any x ∈ H 0 satisfies these conditions, then x H * ( f ) ≤ x, P−a.s. In other words, the superhedging price of f is the essential lower bound of the initial values of all nonnegative admissible portfolio processes, whose terminal value dominates f . Notice that G 0 is non trivial implying that the superhedging price x G * ( f ) is a random variable. However, this price is constant on each event {G = g i }.
We come next to the superhedging theorem that shows how the superhedging price and a superhedging strategy for f in G can be obtained in terms of the superhedging price and the associated strategy in F by restricting f to the individual events {G = g i }.
Theorem 3.3. Let G be discrete and suppose that Assumptions 2.6 and 2.9 hold true. Then, i) The superhedging price for a claim f ≥ 0 in the (G, P)−market is given by 
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, here we also make use of Theorem 4.1 in [10] , which relates the superhedging price under a measure P to that under a measure Q, with respect to which P is only absolutely continuous, but not necessarily equivalent. The role of the measure Q in [10] will be played here by the measure P and that of P in [10] by the various measures Q i defined in (1). To make clear which measure is being used, in this proof we shall use the notation x
For each i, we denote by H F,i the F-predictable strategy which superhedges f in the
This inequality holds also under P when restricted on {G = g i }, namely
Summing up these inequalities we obtain
Finally, we prove that the initial capital ∑ i x
where H G is a G-predictable strategy. Hence,
By using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can replace H G on the various events {G = g i } by an F-predictable strategyH F,i and then
By definition, the superhedging price of f under Q i is not greater than y and so we conclude that ∑ i x
We now give a specific definition of a market with optimal arbitrage which is adapted to the context of initial filtration enlargement and is motivated by Lemma 3.3 in [10] . Definition 3.5. There is optimal arbitrage in the (H, P)−market if x H * (1) ≤ 1 and
s. then the optimal arbitrage is said to be strong.
From this definition and Theorem 3.3 it follows that there is optimal arbitrage for the insider if and only if x
where Z is the density of the unique martingale measure. Therefore, in a complete market there always exists strong optimal arbitrage.
It follows from Remark 3.4 in [10] that, under NUPBR, one has x H * (1) > 0 P-a.s. However, x H * (1) > 0 does not imply NUPBR (see [29] for a market model that does not satisfy NUPBR, but satisfies NA, which implies x H * (1) > 0).
Expected utility maximization for an insider
This subsection concerns utility maximization. We first formulate the precise relationship between absence of arbitrage, in particular NUPBR, and utility maximization, and then show that expected utility maximization in the enlarged market can be performed by an analog of classical duality also under absence of an ELMMD. Given a concave and strictly increasing utility function U(·), the corresponding portfolio optimization problem is given by
Recall that it is shown in [24] that, if NUPBR fails, then u(x) = +∞ for all x > 0 or the problem has infinitely many solutions. This result implies immediately the following statement, which we formulate as a proposition because of its importance. It holds in general and not only in the specific case of this section. In particular, a criterion allowing to show that NUPBR holds is thus to show that e.g. the log-utility maximization leads to a finite value. Notice, however, that NUPBR does not imply that expected utility is finite.
We now discuss the duality approach for utility maximization. Before stating the main theorem, we prove one preliminary lemma. This lemma, which we state for a general increasing function, shows that it is possible to relate the expected utility of the insider to the expected utility of regular agents when restricted to the events {G = g i }.
In this lemma and below we denote by A F 1 and A G 1 the set of 1-admissible strategies that are predictable with respect to F and G respectively. Lemma 3.7. Let U be an increasing function. Then,
Proof. The proof only requires the representation of G-predictable processes as it was used in the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3. We do not need Assumption 2.9 here. (≤) Let H G ∈ A G be a G-predictable strategy. As mentioned above, the Gpredictable process H G can be expressed as
where the equality follows from the fact that S is a G-semimartingale. Consequently
where we used the fact that U is increasing to take the expectation since it implies that both expressions under the E sign are bounded from below. Taking the supremum over the set of all G-admissible strategies we obtain the inequality (≤) in (5).
. . , n be F-predictable strategies. Then, the strategy H G = ∑ n i=1 H F,i 1 G=g i is G-predictable and the following straightforward inequality completes the proof.
The following theorem leads to a new characterization of the expected utility of the insider in terms of the additional information G and the set of all local martingale densities of the (F, P)-market. (ii) For every y ∈ (0, ∞), there exists Z ∈ ELMMD(F, P) with
Then,
Proof. In view of Lemma 3.7, it suffices to show that for every i,
Following the reasoning in the latter part of the proof of Theorem 3.1 that relates the (F, Q i )−markets to the (F, P)−market and using Assumption 2.9, one can again use Theorem 4.1 in [10] to show that the (F, Q i )-market satisfies the condition NUPBR. Furthermore, for any local martingale density Z ∈ ELMMD(F, P), the process Z/p g i is a local martingale deflator for the (F,
Let us next introduce the following subsets of L 0
Because the (F, P)-market was assumed to satisfy NFLVR, Proposition 3.1 of [28] implies that C and D are convex with the following properties
These imply that for every i,
and thus the assumption (3.1) of [31] holds for C i (1) and D i (1) under the measure Q i . In addition, C i and D i contain at least one strictly positive element. Define, following [31] , the optimization problems
For all y > 0, the finiteness of v(y) follows from the assumptions of the Theorem. Furthermore, since x ∈ C i (x), we have u(x) > −∞ for all x > 0. An application of Theorem 3.2 of [31] then shows that u and v satisfy biconjugacy relations so that in particular u(x) = inf y>0 (v(y) + xy). Taking x = 1 and substituting the explicit expression for Q i , the proof is complete.
From Theorem 3.8, one immediately obtains more explicit expressions for the case of power and logarithmic utility functions.
Corollary 3.9. Fix γ ∈ (0, 1). Let G be discrete, suppose that Assumptions 2.6 and 2.9 hold true, and that there exists Z ∈ ELMMD(F, P) with
E P [(Z T ) − γ 1−γ ] < ∞. Then, sup H∈A G 1 E P [(V 1,H T ) γ ] = ∑ i inf Z∈ELMMD(F,P) E P (Z T ) − γ 1−γ 1 G=g i 1−γ .
Corollary 3.10. Let G be discrete, suppose that Assumptions 2.6 and 2.9 hold true, and that there exists Z ∈ ELMMD(F, P) with
To conclude this subsection, we shall compare our result for the logarithmic utility with the results in [4] . Let the additional expected log-utility of the insider be denoted by ∆(F, G) := sup
In the approach of [4] , the quantity ∆(F, G) is represented by the information drift, see Definition 3.6 in their paper, and in our approach, it can be expressed as
If the market is complete, then the two approaches end up with the same result: the quantity in (6) 
Example
In this subsection we present an explicit example which corresponds to an incomplete market. A complete market example based on the standard Brownian motion is given in [11] .
Suppose that N 1 and N 2 are two independent Poisson processes with common intensity λ = 1. We consider a financial market with the (discounted) risky asset price S t = e N 1 t −N 2 t whose dynamics is given by
The public information F is generated by the two Poisson processes N 1 , N 2 . The (F, P)-market satisfies the NFLVR condition, and the density Z of any equivalent local martingale measure is of the form
where α 1 , α 2 are positive integrable processes satisfying α 1 t = e −1 α 2 t . Let us define N t := N 1 t − N 2 t and assume that the insider knows the value of N T , and hence of S T , at the beginning of trading. The insider's filtration is thus
). An easy computation shows that for all t ∈ [0, T ),
Since the density p x t is strictly positive before time T , Assumption (2.9) is fulfilled. Theorem 3.1 allows then to conclude that the (G, P)-market satisfies NUPBR.
Optimal arbitrage.
By Theorem 3.3, the superhedging price of 1 under G is
To check whether optimal arbitrage exists, we need to compute
for every x ∈ Z. This is the goal of the following proposition.
Proposition 3.11. If x ≤ 0, we have
and there is no optimal arbitrage. If x > 0, we have that
and the optimal arbitrage strategy is the strategy in which the agent buys 1 
S T units of the risky asset and holds them until maturity.
Proof. First, we consider the case x ≤ 0. Let us define τ = inf{t : N t = x}. We fix two constants M > m > 0 and choose α 1 t = M1 t≤τ + m1 t>τ . The process α 1 t , and consequently also α For this measure, the following inequality holds true.
By the strong Markov property, N 1 τ+s − N 1 τ and N 2 τ+s − N 2 τ are independent Poisson processes with intensities m and em, independent from F τ . Therefore,
where P m is the probability measure under which N 1 is a Poisson process with intensity m and N 2 is a Poisson process with intensity em. On the other hand, up to time τ, N 1 and N 2 are independent Poisson processes with intensities M and eM. Therefore,
Letting m go to zero and M go to infinity and using the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain sup P∈ELMM(F,P)
So, the first statement holds true.
Coming next to the case x > 0, we notice that e −x is an upper bound for the supremum. Indeed, for any ELMM P, it holds that
Repeating the computations as in the first case, we obtain
It thus suffices to show that
Let τ 1 , τ 2 be the first jump times of N 1 and N 2 , respectively. Because τ 1 ∼ Exp(1) and τ 2 ∼ Exp(e) are independent under P 1 , the random variable
has the density 1 (1+t) 2 , thanks to Lemma 4.12, and thus,
From its definition, we have f (0) = 1 and for x ≥ 1 it then follows that
Therefore, we obtain f (
and thus
Because lim x→∞ f (x) = 0, we have that f (1) = e −1 and then f (x) = e −x . Now we show that the buy and hold strategy is optimal. Because the insider knows the value of S T = e N T , the buy and hold strategy, consisting of 1 S T units of the risky asset, superreplicates the claim 1. In fact
For this the insider needs the initial capital e −x on the event N T = x.
Expected log-utility.
By Corollary 3.10 the expected log-utility of the insider is sup
Choosing a specific strategy H in the left-hand side, we obtain a lower bound for the log utility, and a specific equivalent martingale measure density Z in the right-hand side provides an upper bound. We are going to construct H and Z for which the two bounds coincide. As a preliminary step, we are going to evaluate the intensities of N 1 and N 2 under G. N 1 and N 2 under G Let λ G,1 , λ G,2 be the intensities of N 1 , N 2 under G, respectively. Introduce a further larger filtration
Intensities of
. Under H, we obtain that
are martingales, see Theorem VI.3 of [33] . Now, Lemma 4.14 of the Appendix implies that the processes
are martingales under G and so
where
. This computation can be made explicit. For example, if y > 0,
where I α (x) is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind 1 . A similar computation for y ≤ 0 shows that for all integer y,
The modified Bessel functions of the first kind is defined by the series representation I α (x) = ∑ m≥0
2m+α , for a real number α which is not a negative integer, and satisfies I −n (x) = I n (x) for integer n so that finally
Upper bound by duality From equation (7), we get
Since we are only interested in an upper bound, we can restrict the discussion to equivalent local martingale densities for which
In this case, the above expectation becomes
is concave as function of α 1 t , with unique maximum attained at
Fix ε > 0 and let
1 0≤t≤T −ε + 1 T −ε<t≤T , and α 2 t = eα 1 t . These values are bounded on [0, T ] implying that the corresponding density satisfies E P [Z T ] = 1 and (11). Plugging it into (12), we obtain sup Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
When ε → 0, the expression under the two expectations is bounded from below and converges monotonically to
and in particular the right-hand side is finite (by the duality result).
A lower bound by direct computation
Let π G be a G-predictable strategy, which denotes the ratio invested in the risky asset, and let V 1,π G be the corresponding self-financing wealth process that starts from x = 1 and whose dynamics are
The logarithm of V 1,π G satisfies Substituting this into (14), we then get
When ε → 0, τ ε → T and the first expectation above clearly converges to (13) . To finish the proof, it remains to check that
. By direct computation, we obtain that M t = e −2(T −t) I |x−N t | (2(T − t) ). The change of variable formula then yields
Initial enlargement with a general random variable
We now consider the case when the F T −measurable random variable G, which represents the insider information, is not purely atomic as it was the case in the previous section.
It is usually observed that in this case the value of logarithmic utility of the insider is infinite, as for example in Theorem 4.4 of [32] where the insider has exact information about at least one stock's terminal price, or in [4] where the insider's additional expected logarithmic utility is related to the entropy of G. This difficulty appears at T , the time when the conditional law of G given F T is a Dirac measure and hence Jacod's condition fails.
Since, as we saw before, NUPBR is the minimal condition for well-posed expected utility maximization problems, it is useful to have conditions for NUPBR to hold. [1] and [2] give a sufficient condition so that NUPBR holds under G in infinite time horizon settings. Their idea is that, if the processes p x and S do not jump to zero at the same time, then one can construct an equivalent (local) martingale deflator (ELMD) under G and it is known that the existence of such an ELMD implies NUPBR. However, in finite horizon settings, it may happen that the process p x is not well-defined at T , making it impossible to define an ELMD because p x appears in the denominator of such an ELMD.
In this paper we consider a finite horizon T > 0 and, in the present section, we shall study arbitrage properties and expected utility maximization for the case of a non-atomic G. Before coming to utility maximization, in the next subsection we show that if G is non-atomic and the set of local martingale densities ELMMD(F, P) is uniformly integrable, then there always exists an arbitrage of the first kind and so NUPBR fails. It shows in particular that, if the (F, P) market is complete, then NUPBR always fails under G. This negative message implies that the non-uniform integrability of ELMMD(F, P) is a necessary condition for NUPBR under G. This result is then accompanied by two examples: one where the set of local martingale densities ELMMD(F, P) is uniformly integrable, and one where it is not. In the second example the expected log-utility is finite, which gives (see Proposition 3.6) a sufficient condition for NUPBR to hold. On the other hand, in this second example the insider has non-scalable arbitrage opportunities so that NFLVR cannot hold. Initial filtration enlargement with a non-atomic F T -measurable random variable may therefore lead to viable market models which allow for economically meaningful unscalable arbitrages.
Arbitrage of the first kind
The following result does not require Assumption 2.9. 
Because the set of all local martingale densities {Z T : Z ∈ ELMMD(F, P)} is uniformly integrable, for any ε > 0 there exists K > 0 such that
The initial capital in (15) can then be estimated by
We can choose ε and n such that the initial capital in (15) is arbitrarily small and thus the random variable 1 G∈B is an arbitrage of the first kind.
Remark 4.2 (A comparison with [4]).
The above proposition extends Theorem 4.4 of [4] . More precisely, [4] 
These inequalities lead to an upper bound for all martingale densities: 
is a non-atomic random variable for which the market of the insider does not satisfy NUPBR.
In the literature there are examples of incomplete market models where NUPBR holds and therefore the set of equivalent martingale densities is not uniformly integrable. The following one is due to [27] . 
In [27] it is shown that all admissible strategies are bounded and the expected logarithmic utility for an insider is bounded from above. This entails that the (G, P)-market satisfies NUPBR (see Proposition 3.6) . Furthermore, the insider has arbitrage opportunities since he knows the final value of S. For example, if he knows that S T > 1, which happens with positive probability, he could buy the asset S and hold it until maturity; being S 0 = 1, this implies a riskless profit.
An approximation procedure
Assume that we are given a non purely atomic random variable G ∈ R representing the information of the insider. Let {Γ n i , i = 1, ..., n} be a finite increasing partition of R + and denote
. We approximate σ (G) by the increasing sequence of sigma algebras σ (G n )
Expected utility maximization
Analogously to subsection 3.2 we consider now the expected utility maximization and a dual representation of the optimal value for the case of a non purely atomic G. Based on Proposition 3.6, this will then allow one to show NUPBR under Assumption 2.9 by using the finiteness of expected utility. We start with the main convergence result Theorem 4.7. Let U : R → R + be increasing and continuous and suppose that S is a continuous semimartingale. Then,
Proof. The inequality ≤ is trivial since U is increasing and
To prove the opposite inequality, we choose H G ∈ A G 1 . Our first aim is to show that H G may be supposed to be bounded. Indeed, the stochastic integral H G · S is defined as the
, and by the dominated convergence theorem for stochastic integrals [33, Theorem IV.32], this limit is attained uniformly in compacts in probability, and hence also almost surely along a subsequence. Introduce the stopping time
Observe that
which means that the strategy defined by 
as n → ∞. By Fatou's lemma we then have
converges to H · S uniformly on compacts in probability, and hence also almost surely along a subsequence. Similarly to the previous part, we construct an admissible strategy from H n by stopping it at a suitable stopping time. An application of Fatou's lemma then shows that lim inf
Observing that the expression under the limit in the left hand side is increasing in n and combining this with the opposite inequality, we conclude the proof. As a corollary to Theorems 4.7 and 3.8, we obtain a dual representation for the utility maximization problem in the case of non-atomic G. 
In the case of logarithmic utility, a more explicit expression may be obtained. Letting n tend to infinity, we get the result.
As a consequence, the insider's log-utility problem is finite if G has finite entropy and for every event {G ∈ Γ n i }, there exists a martingale density Z T such that the quantity E P [1 G∈Γ n i log(1/Z T )] can compensate the term − log |Γ n i |P[G ∈ Γ n i ]. In complete markets, it is impossible to find such a martingale density for each event, implying that expected log-utility of the insider is infinite. In incomplete markets, the result provides us with a new criterion for NUPBR under G as stated in the following 
then the condition NUPBR holds under G.
Proof. Consider (17) for partitions of the form Γ n i = (a i , a i + ε n ) with ε n ↓ 0. Using then (18) in (17) 
The expected log-utility of the insider is bounded and hence, by Proposition 3.6, the condition NUPBR holds under G. Hence M G is a G-martingale.
